Louisiana Law Review
Volume 27 | Number 3
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1965-1966 Term: A Symposium
April 1967

Mineral Law - Effect of Compulsory Unitization
Orders on the Use Requirements of a Mineral
Servitude
Robert A. Seale Jr.

Repository Citation
Robert A. Seale Jr., Mineral Law - Effect of Compulsory Unitization Orders on the Use Requirements of a Mineral Servitude, 27 La. L. Rev.
(1967)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol27/iss3/27

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

NOTES
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assuming a single servitude reduced to that part actually preserved by possession during ten years, the court treads on dangerous ground when the unconsidered nature of the servitude
appears to be discontinuous, for this could lead to most undesirable consequences, as previously pointed out. It is the method
used to reach the result which offends, not the result itself'.
If this discontinuous servitude was in fact a single right extending over the entire tract, the use made by the plaintiff should
have'preserved the entire servitude, and enabled him to lay additional pipelines according to the terms of the agreement between the parties. It is submitted that in future cases the Louisiana courts should decide the effect of such multiple line agreements, establish definitively the nature of the gas pipeline servitude, and recognize the wisdom of the Court of Cassation in
limiting the effect of the rule contained in Civil Code article 798
to continuous servitudes and those discontinuous servitudes
whose full use is prohibited by some physical obstacle.
Charles S. Weems, Jr.

MINERAL RIGHTS -

EFFECT OF COMPULSORY UNITIZATION

ORDERS ON THE USE REQUIREMENTS OF A

MINERAL SERVITUDE
On September 22, 1949, an undivided one-half mineral interest affecting a 340-acre contiguous tract was granted to Group
One. In 1956, the landowner granted the remaining one-half
interest to Group Two. In 1959,1 less than ten years after creation of the 1949 servitude, a dry unit well was drilled on a part
(96 acres) of the servitude premises included within a 1959 compulsory unit. Production was thereafter obtained on two other
.units formed in 1960 which included a part of the servitude
premises outside the original unit. Group One claimed that prescription on the whole tract was interrupted in 1959 by the dryhole unit well drilled on the servitude premises. Group Two,
which allegedly purchased an additional one-half mineral interest from the landowner September 23, 1959, on the part of the
1. There are apparent minor discrepancies between the statement of facts in
the Supreme Court opinion here noted and in the recitation of facts in the opinion
of the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, 179 So. 2d 540 (1965) ; e.g., the court of
appeal indicated this first unit well was drilled in 1956.
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tract not included in the original unit, claimed all of the mineral
rights as to that area. It contended that the 1959 dry unit well
only interrupted prescription running on the 1949 servitude as
to the 96 acres within the original unit, urging that inclusion of
only a part of the servitude tract within the unit had the effect
of "dividing" the servitude.
The trial court sustained the contention of Group Two. The
court of appeal reversed. In affirming the court of appeal the
Louisiana Supreme Court held, if a tract burdened with a 'mineral servitude is located partially within a drilling unit formed
by order of the conservation commissioner, a unit well drilled
on any portion of the servitude within the unit interrupts prescription as to the entire tract. Trunkline Gas Co. v. Steen, 249
La. 520, 187 So. 2d 720 (1966).
Prior to 1920, there Was little authority upon which to base
legal rules pertaining to mineral conveyances. However, the landmark decision of Frost-JohnsonLumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs2
left the way open for the courts to look to the Civil Code servitude provisions in determining the legal ramifications of mineral
conveyances. In part these principles provide that both personal
and predial servitudes must be "used" to prevent their termination by ten-year liberative prescription. 3 However, no definition
of "use" is provided by the Code. In the absence of legislation,
the Supreme Court sought to fashion a systematic set of use
requirements for prescription interruption.
Using article 789 of the Civil Code as a starting point, the
court set forth a standard of use which requires, in the case of
a mineral servitude, "good faith" drilling on the servitude prem2. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207
(1922).
3. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 646 (1870) : "All servitudes which affect lands may be
divided into two kinds, personal and real.
"Personal servitudes are those attached to the person for whose benefit they
are established, and terminate with his life. This kind of servitude is of three
sorts: usufruct, use and habitation.
"Real servitudes, which are also called predial or landed servitudes, are those
which the owner of an estate enjoys on a neighboring estate for the benefit of his
own estate."
Id. art. 618: "The usufruct may be forfeited likewise by the non-usage of this
right by the usufructuary or by any person in his name, during ten years, whether
the usufruct be constituted on an entire estate, or only on a divided or undivided
part of an estate."
Id. art. 628: "The rights of use and habitation are established and extinguished
in the same manner as usufruct."
Id. art. 789: "A right to servitude is extinguished by the non-usage of the same
during ten years."
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ises to a depth at which there is reasonable expectation of production in commercial quantities.4 While this rule has been
rationalized as a use contemplated by the parties, it is fairly
clear that in the early days of mineral transactions and development, no such contemplation or intent existed. Thus as a matter
of law, the courts have supplied what may be termed an "assumed intent" to the standard described above, and the liberative
prescriptive of ten years has also been imposed on these transactions. To what extent parties to these contracts have freedom
to alter these requirements is somewhat unclear. While it is possible to make these use requirements more burdensome,5 it is
unknown whether relaxation of the requirements is possible;
the prevailing view seems to be that they may not." However, it
has been established that a use on any part of a servitude tract
7
interrupts prescription on the entire tract.
Conservation legislation brought widespread unitization of
oil and gas properties, raising new problems concerning use of
mineral servitudes, including the effect of unit operations on
prescription. Some answers were given in Childs v. Washington,8 and Jumonville Pipe & Machinery Co. v. Federal Land
Bank.0 There, the Supreme Court held that where there was a
partial inclusion of a servitude tract in a drilling unit established by the commissioner of conservation, a producing well
drilled within the unit, but not on the servitude tract, interrupted
prescription only as to that portion of the servitude within the
unit boundaries, the commissioner's orders having "reduced" the
servitude to the extent of the unit.'0 What effect these operations would have if conducted on the servitude tract remained
• 4. McMurrey v. Gray, 216 La. 904, 917, 45 So. 2d 73, 77, 78 (19481 ; Lynn v.
Harrington, 193 La. 877, 192 So. 517 (1939).
5. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 940, 132 So. 2d 845,
853, 854 (1961).
6. Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 381 U.S. 413 (1965) ; Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 329 F. 2d 85 (5th Cir. 1964) ; United States v.
Leiter Minerals, Inc., 204 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. La. 1962) ; Leiter Minerals, Inc.
v. California Co., 241 La. 915, 132 So. 2d 845 (1961).
7. McMurrey v. Gray, 216 La. 904, 45 So. 2d 73 (1949) ; Hunter v. Ulrich,
200 La. 536, 8 So. 2d 531 (1942) ; Lynn v. Harrington, 193 La. 877, 192 So. 517
(1939) ; Louisiana Petroleum Co. v. Broussard, 172 La. 613, 135 So. 1 (1931)
Keebler v. Seubert, 167 La. 901, 120 So. 591 (1929).
8. Childs v. Washington, 229 La. 869, 87 So. 2d 111 (1956).
9. Jumonville Pipe & Machinery Co. v. Federal Land Bank, 230 La. 41, 87
So.2d 721 (1956).
10. See Childs v. Washington, 229 La. 869, 879, 87 So. 2d 111, 114 (1956)
for a more complete discussion of this problem see Hardy, Ruminations on the
Effect of Conservation Laws and Practices on the Louisiana Mineral Servitude
and Mineral Royalty, 25 LA. L. REv. 824, 845 (1965).
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undetermined until the instant case. Two choices were available:
limiting the use to the unit boundaries in accord with Childs and
Jumonville, or relying on the older rules regarding operations on
the servitude premises, to extend the use to the entire servitude
tract. Part of the difficulty in making the proper choice probably resulted from prior decisions in which there was frequent
mention of the idea that the mere issuance of the commissioner's
order had some "divisive" effect." Adding further confusion
were cases in which it had been held that there could be a division of the "advantages" of a servitude. The leading cases in
this area were Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson12 and Spears v. Nesbitt.18
However, it should be remembered that they involved contracts
entered into by the servitude owners subsequent to the original
conveyance; thus, some basis for determining whether an intent
to divide existed as a matter of contractual interpretation. On
the other hand, compulsory unitization cases do not involve interpretation of instruments other than the original conveyance.
Thus the rules imposed on the original conveyances in these
instances are not based on any contractual interpretation of the
"intent of the parties," but rather on legal policy. Trunkline
follows the older rule and therefore rejects the notion of division or reduction of a servitude upon issuance of the commissioner's order.
As previously stated, the issue presented by the instant case
was whether a unit well drilled on a servitude tract partially
included within a drilling unit created by the commissioner of
conservation interrupted prescription only on that portion of
the servitude within the unit or as to the entire servitude tract.
In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that by adoption of
the conservation act, the legislature was careful to protect the,
valuable property and contractual rights of mineral owners. It
was further recognized that any order of the commissioner
which was not necessary for the conservation of natural resources, or one which would unnecessarily deprive an owner of
his rights to property would be illegal and uhconstitutional.
Thus, the well drilled on the servitude premises in 1959 had the
effect of interrupting prescription on the entire tract.
11. See Jumonville Pipe & Machinery Co. v. Federal Land Bank, 230 La. 41,
87 So. 2d 721 (1956) ; Childs v. Washington, 229 La. 869, 87 So. 2d 111 (1956)
Frey v. Miller, 165 So. 2d 43 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
12. Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, 213 La. 183, 34 So. 2d 746 (1947).
13. Spears v. Nesbitt, 197 La. 931, 2 So. 2d 650 (1941) ; see also Elson v.
Mathews, 224 La. 417, 69 So. 2d 734 (1954).
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Justice Summers dissented on the basis of Childs and Jumonville. He also pointed out that, under the conservation act, location of wells is determined by available geological and engineering data, and final placement of a well is the optimum position
for efficient and economic drainage of the unit. Therefore, he
reasoned that location had no relation to the servitude tract, and
the division of production in each case was on the basis of the
proportion which the acreage of the individual tract bore to the
entire unit acreage. Since there was no theoretical drainage outside of the unit boundaries, Justice Summers concluded that it
was unconstitutional to give interruptive effect to prescription
on premises outside these boundaries because the mineral owner
retained the right to conduct operations there.
It is submitted that the result reached in the instant case is
sound in that it reflects the traditional rule that use on the servitude premises is a use of the entire tract. This is the standard
upon which parties have relied in negotiating mineral contracts
in recent years. It has been suggested that when minerals are
drained by a unit well from beneath a servitude tract, wholly or
partially located within a compulsory unit, there is a use as if
the well were located on the tract. 14 This is already the law pertaining to royalty rights under voluntary unitization plans, 15
and is also consistent with the result contemplated by the conservation act. 16 Whether this result will be forthcoming in the
near future is doubtful since the Childs and Jumonville decisions
have not been overruled. Where operations are conducted within
the unit but not on the servitude tract, it is implied that the "dry
hole" use will be given effect as to that portion of the servitude
included within the unit.' 7 The same reasons for limiting this
14. See Hardy, Ruminations on the Effect of Conservation Laws and Practices

on the Louisiana Mineral Servitude and Mineral Royalty, 25 LA. L. REV. 824

(1965).
15. Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Barousse, 238 La. 1013, 117 So. 2d
575 (1960); Montie v. Sabine Royalty Co., 161 So. 2d 118 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1964).
16. LA. R.S. 30:10 (1950) : "A. When two or more separately owned tracts
of land are embraced within a drilling unit which has been established by the
commissioner as provided in R.S. 30:9B, the owners may validly agree to pool
their interests and to develop their lands as a drilling unit.
"(1). Where the owners have not agreed to pool their'interests, the commis-

sioner shall require them to do so and to develop their lands as a drilling unit, if
he finds it to be necessary to prevent waste or to avoid drilling unnecessary wells.
"(b) The portion of the production allocated to the owner of each tract included
in a drilling unit formed by a pooling order shall, when produced be considered
as if it had been provided from his tract by a well drilled thereon." (Emphasis

added.)
17. See Mire v. Hawkins, 249 La. 278, 186 So. 2d 591 (1966).
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effect to the unit boundaries in production cases applies to the
dry hole cases.
The critical question, therefore, is not one of "division," but
one of "use." Once a determination of what constitutes a use
has been made, a further consideration, which is equally important, is the extent this use be given effect. While there are
established rules in this area from which 'to work, they are at
present incomplete. Because of the importance these considerations have on the economy of the state, legislation is needed to
impose orderly rules which achieve just results. The Louisiana
State Law Institute is currently undertaking the difficult task
of proposing mineral legislation for the state. During the course
of its deliberations the institute will no doubt be confronted with
these questions, and the legal profession may be provided with
the answers in the not too distant future.
Robert A. Seale, Jr.

